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Can a Court Change the Law by
Saying Nothing?
Paul R. Gugliuzza*
Mark A. Lemley**
Can an appellate court alter substantive law without writing an
opinion? We attempt to answer that question by conducting a novel
empirical investigation into how the Federal Circuit has implemented
the Supreme Court's 2014 ruling in Alice v. CLS Bank, the most recent
in a series of Supreme Court decisions strengthening patent law's
patentable subject matter requirement. Our dataset includes each one of
the Federal Circuit's more than 100 decisions on patentable subject
matter in the three years since Alice, including affirmances issued
without an opinion under Federal CircuitRule 36.
Including those no-opinion affirmances, the Federal Circuit has
found the patent to be invalid in more than 90% of its decisions. The
court's precedential opinions, however, tell a different story: nearly a
quarter of them favor the patentee by rejecting challenges to patent
validity. This difference is due largely to one remarkablefact: although
the court has issued over fifty Rule 36 affirmances finding the asserted
patent to be invalid, it has not issued a single Rule 36 affirmance when
finding in favor of a patentee. Rather, it has written an opinion in every
one of those cases.
As a result, the Federal Circuit'sprecedential opinions provide
an inaccuratepicture of how disputes over patentable subject matter are
actually resolved. Precedential opinions suggest that any given patent
has a decent chance of surviving an eligibility challenge at the Federal
Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law.
William H. Neukom Professor, Stanford Law School; partner, Durie Tangri LLP. For
comments and helpful discussions, thanks to Margo Bagley, Jeremy Bock, Dennis Crouch, Stacey
Dogan, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Wendy Gordon, Rose Hagan, Peter Harter, Tim Holbrook, Keith Hylton,
Dmitry Karshtedt, Megan La Belle, Jonathan Masur, Mike Meurer, Lisa Ouellette, Kevin
Outterson, Arti Rai, Jason Rantanen, Rachel Rebouch6, Greg Reilly, Michael Risch, Jay Thomas,
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Melissa Wasserman, and workshop participants at the IP Scholars
Conference and the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Conference. Additional
thanks to Jason Rantanen and Michael Kwun, whose databases of Federal Circuit decisions were
invaluable in preparing this Article, and to James Yoon for research assistance.
C 2018 Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley.
*
**

765

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

766

[Vol. 71:3:765

Circuit. But, in reality, very few patents do. Our findings suggest that,
by saying nothing, a court can indeed affect substantive law, or at least
the perception of it. This has interesting implications both for the
ongoing debate over the legality of Rule 36 and, more broadly, for
understanding the differences between the law on the books and the
actual experience of litigants.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's patentable subject matter decisions
between 2010 and 2014 upended the law in important ways. In four
decisions culminating in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,'the
Court reinvigorated the long-dormant doctrine, setting forth a new test
for assessing patentable subject matter that threw out prior Federal
Circuit precedent and sent the patent bar into a tizzy.

1.

134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
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In this Article, we conduct a novel empirical investigation into
how the Federal Circuit has implemented Alice in the three years since
it was decided. Our dataset includes each of the Federal Circuit's 104
post-Alice decisions on patentable subject matter, including
precedential opinions, nonprecedential opinions, and, crucially,
affirmances without opinion under Federal Circuit Rule 36.2
Among our more interesting findings is that the Federal Circuit
writes precedential opinions much more frequently when it rules in
favor of the patentee than when it invalidates the patent. Overall, the
Federal Circuit has found the patent to be valid in only 7.7% of its postAlice decisions on patentable subject matter. But nearly three times as
many (21.2%) of the court's post-Alice precedential opinions favor the
patentee by rejecting challenges to patent validity. Remarkably,
although the court has issued over fifty Rule 36 affirmances finding the
asserted patent to be invalid, it has not issued a single Rule 36
affirmance when finding in favor of a patentee. Rather, it has written
an opinion in every one of those cases.
The disproportionate number of precedential opinions favoring
patentees obscures the actual trends in the cases. It also has significant
implications for substantive patent law and for the process of appellate
judging. For example, one might interpret the Federal Circuit's
preference for precedential opinions when ruling in favor of patentees
as evidence of the court undermining the Supreme Court's restrictions
on patentable subject matter, which would be consistent with longstanding perceptions of the Federal Circuit as biased in favor of patent
owners. 3 Similarly, the large number of Rule 36 affirmances
invalidating patents could indicate that the court is "hiding" those
decisions, lending support to recent arguments that the Federal

Including Rule 36 affirmances is essential to providing an accurate empirical analysis of
2.
the Federal Circuit's decisionmaking practices. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 234 (2005); David
L. Schwartz, PracticeMakes Perfect?An Empirical Study of Claim ConstructionReversal Rates in
Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 235 (2008); see also John R. Allison et al., Understandingthe
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (2014) (noting that many
empirical studies of patent litigation omit unreported decisions such as Rule 36 affirmances).
Because Rule 36 affirmances say nothing besides "AFFIRMED," however, one must review the
docket and the parties' briefs for each case to determine the legal issues in dispute, which we have
done for this Article. Appendix A, infra, provides a full list of the decisions included in our dataset.
For administrability, we ended our data collection on June 19, 2017, the three-year anniversary of
Alice. For a more detailed description of our methodology, see infra notes 80, 84.
3.
See generally Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity
Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1628 n.40 (2007) (summarizing conflicting arguments about
whether the Federal Circuit has, in fact, been "pro-patent").
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Circuit's use of Rule 36 is unwise as a policy matter, inconsistent with
the requirements of the Patent Act, or even unconstitutional. 4
We think, however, that there are two other more likely
explanations for the disproportionate number of precedential opinions
upholding validity against challenges to patentable subject matter. The
first relates to the fact that, as high as the invalidity rate is in the
Federal Circuit (92.3%), the invalidity rate in the district court and
Patent Office proceedings that have so far been reviewed by the Federal
Circuit is even higher: 96.2%. Thus, the Federal Circuit has had very
few opportunities to even consider affirming a ruling of validity via Rule
36. And appeals from rulings of invalidity are now such a common
occurrence in the Federal Circuit that many of those cases may be the
types of "easy" cases for which Rule 36 was designed. But there are
many more district court decisions upholding validity than have been
appealed to the Federal Circuit so far.5 Once the Federal Circuit begins
reviewing more decisions upholding validity, the court's high rate of
finding invalidity could decrease.
A second reason for the disproportionate number of precedential
opinions upholding validity is that the judges of the Federal Circuit are
simply responding to the demands of their audience, as one might
expect from a semi-specialized court.6 After four Supreme Court
decisions in four years ruling against the patentee on patentable subject
matter,7 and another six months of post-Alice Federal Circuit decisions

4.
See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Wrongly Affirmed Without Opinion, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
561, 562-63 (2017); Gene Quinn & Peter Harter, Does the Federal Circuit's Use ofRule 36 Call into
Question Integrity
of
the Judicial Process?, IPWATCHDOG
(Feb.
14,
2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/02/14/federal-circuit-rule-36-integrity-judicial-processlid=78261
[https://perma.cc/FEU6-7FCM]; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 24-29, Leak Surveys,
Inc. v. FLIR Sys., Inc., No. 17-194 (U.S. Aug. 1, 2017) (arguing that the Federal Circuit's use of
Rule 36 is unlawful in appeals from the Patent Office), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 325 (2017) (mem.);
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17-20, Celgard, LLC v. Matal, No. 16-1526 (U.S. filed June 19,
2017) (same); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, Petter Invs. v. Hydro Eng'g, No. 17-1055
(U.S. filed Jan. 18, 2018) (arguing that Rule 36 affirmances in appeals from district court litigation
violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 2018 WL 575049 (U.S. Apr. 2,
2018) (mem.). But see Matthew J. Dowd, An Examination of the Federal Circuit's Use of Rule 36
Affirmances (Feb. 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920306
[https://perma.cclLU8H-BARN] (defending the Federal Circuit's use of Rule 36). For an
explanation of the argument that Rule 36 violates the Patent Act, see infra Section III. B.
5.
See infra Section III.A.
6.

See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL

BEHAVIOR 99 (2006).
7.
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
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invalidating patents,8 patent applicants, litigants, district judges, and
the Patent Office needed examples of inventions that remained patent
eligible. The Federal Circuit has delivered by writing a precedential
opinion nearly every time it has concluded that a patent is valid. But as
a consequence, the court's precedential opinions provide an inaccurate
picture of how disputes over patentable subject matter are actually
resolved.
In this Article, we take a step toward correcting any
misconceptions about the law of patentable subject matter by providing
empirical evidence on how the Federal Circuit has dealt with Alice on
appeal, including through the often-overlooked mechanism of Rule 36
affirmances without opinion.9 In Part I, we discuss the doctrine of
patentable subject matter and the controversial changes Alice and its
progeny have wrought. In Part II, we present our empirical evaluation
of every Federal Circuit decision on patentable subject matter since
Alice. Finally, in Part III, we discuss the implications of our findings for
both the substantive law of patentable subject matter and the role of
Rule 36 in shaping the contours of legal doctrine. Whether in patent law
or in other fields, understanding the operation of law in practice
requires looking beyond written opinions to see what the courts are
saying when they say nothing.
I. THE RESURRECTION OF THE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
REQUIREMENT

To provide context for our empirical analysis, we first offer an
introduction to the patentable subject matter requirement and the
controversy surrounding current doctrine.
A. PatentableSubject Matter and the Supreme Court
Section 101 of the Patent Act permits patents on any new and
useful "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."10
8.
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google,
Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App'x 1005 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
As one Federal Circuit judge and a co-author recently noted, "Although Rule 36
9.
affirmances without opinion are not frequently a focus of the academic literature, they account for

a significant number of Federal Circuit dispositions." Evan J. Wallach & Jonathan J. Darrow,
Federal Circuit Review of USPTO Inter PartesReview Decisions, by the Numbers: How the AI4
Has Impacted the Caseload of the Federal Circuit, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 105, 113
(2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra Figure 1 (reporting that Rule 36
affirmances account for 42.3% of Federal Circuit decisions in appeals from district courts and the
Patent and Trademark Office).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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Despite that broad language, courts have long held that § 101 contains
an "implicit exception" that prohibits patenting laws of nature, natural
phenomena (sometimes, "product[s] of nature""), and abstract ideas. 12
The story of how the courts have developed and applied that exception
is long and complicated.13 For the purpose of this Article, we can pick
up the thread in the 1980s, when the Supreme Court turned away from
prior case law limiting the patent eligibility of relatively primitive
innovations in biotechnology14 and computer software. 15 Early in that
decade, the Court upheld the patent eligibility of a self-replicating,
genetically modified bacterium, 1 6 and also confirmed the eligibility of a
computer-driven process for molding rubber.17 Ushering in a new era,
the Court selectively quoted from the legislative history of the 1952
Patent Act to claim that "Congress intended statutory subject matter to
'include anything under the sun that is made by man.' "18
11.
12.
13.

Myriad, 569 U.S. at 580.
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354.
For thorough analyses of the evolution of the patentable subject matter requirement, see,

for example, 1 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 277-314 (2017); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER:
REPORT ON VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PUBLIC 3-16 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/

sites/default/files/documents/101-ReportFINAL.pdf

[https://perma.cc/K3ML-5PRY];

Margo A.

Bagley, PatentBarbariansat the Gate: The Who, What, When, Where, Why and How of U.S. Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Disputes, in PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 149, 151-55 (Ruth L.

Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds., 2014); Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2001); Kevin Emerson Collins,
Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 345-60 (2007); Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of
Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski's Superficial Textualism
and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1289, 1292-305 (2011); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection
for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-RelatedInventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1032-98

(1990); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 53, 63-84 (2011); Peter S. Menell & Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Rethinking Patent Eligibility
for the Modern Scientific Age 7-10 (U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2402776, 2014;
97,
2014),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2402776
U.C.
Hastings,
Research
Paper No.
[https://perma.cc/9Q5M-26NJ].
14. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948) (invalidating a patent
on a composition of two naturally occurring bacteria).

15.

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (holding that a process that used a

mathematical formula for updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion was not patent

eligible); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (holding ineligible for patenting a
computer program that used a mathematical formula to convert binary-coded decimal numerals
into pure binary numbers).

16. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
17. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
18. Id. at 182 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 6 (1952)); accord
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. The full sentence in the committee reports suggests a different
understanding: "A person may have 'invented' a machine or a manufacture, which may include
anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section
101 unless the conditions of [this] title are fulfilled." S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 1923, at
6; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 641-42 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
(criticizing the truncated presentation of the legislative history).
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In the wake of those Supreme Court decisions, the Federal
Circuit further loosened restrictions on patent eligibility, rendering the
patentable subject matter requirement effectively a dead letter. 19 In the
1990s and early 2000s, the Patent Office regularly issued-and the
Federal Circuit regularly upheld the validity of-patents on computer
software,2 0 business methods, 2 1 and isolated DNA sequences. 22 After
the bursting of the internet stock bubble in 2001, however, many
software and business method patents ended up in the hands of patent
assertion entities ("PAEs," or, more controversially, "patent trolls"). 23
Around the same time, concerns began to emerge that DNA patents
were creating an anticommons inhibiting the emergence of useful gene
therapies. 24 Also, because patents covering genetic information are
nearly impossible to invent around, those patents sometimes appeared
to be impairing clinical practice, hindering the development of
diagnostics and therapeutics, and, ultimately, harming patients. 25
These considerations, among others, led to widespread calls for
tightening the standards of patentability. 26
In 2006, the Supreme Court briefly flirted with the patentable
subject matter requirement in a case it ultimately dismissed as
improvidently granted. 2 7 A year later (and perhaps following the
Supreme Court's signal 28), the Federal Circuit cautiously added some
teeth to the patentable subject matter requirement in two decisions
issued on the same day. In one decision, the court upheld the Patent
19. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2011).
20. E.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
21. E.g., State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
22. See generally Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix:
A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualizationof the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303,
358-60 (2002) (discussing the relevant case law and the Patent Office's patent-granting practices).
23. James M. Rice, The Defensive Patent Playbook, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 737-38
(2015).
24.

DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE

IT 87-89 (2009).
25. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption,
Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1370 (2011)
(discussing problems of preemption and overbreadth in biotechnology patents).
26. See, e.g., U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 14-15 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/
innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZTR8-P57R]; see also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari)
(arguing for a more rigorous patentable subject matter requirement, noting an "important ongoing
debate" about "whether the patent system, as currently administered and enforced, adequately
reflects the 'careful balance' that 'the federal patent laws . . . embod[y]'" (alterations in original)).
27. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 125.
28. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Essay, The Federal Circuit'sAcquiescence(?), 66 AM. U. L. REV.
1061, 1076 (2017).
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Office's rejection of an application claiming electromagnetic signals
designed to prevent unauthorized copying of digital content, reasoning
that a transitory signal does not fall within the four categories of
patentable subject matter listed in § 101 ("process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter"). 2 9 In the other decision, the
Federal Circuit held that a method of requiring and conducting
arbitration was not patentable subject matter, emphasizing that,
although some business methods are patent eligible, the application at
issue impermissibly claimed the "mental processes" used to resolve a
legal dispute. 30
The Supreme Court's renewed interest in patentable subject
matter began in 2010 with Bilski v. Kappos.31 In that case, the Supreme
Court invalidated a patent on a method of hedging financial risk,
holding that it claimed an "abstract idea" and was therefore not
patentable subject matter. 32
Two years later, the Supreme Court considered another
patentable subject matter dispute, Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., which involved diagnostic tests used to
help doctors determine whether the dosage of a particular drug was too
low or too high. 33 The patent-in-suit claimed a method of administering
the drug to a patient, measuring its metabolite levels in the body, and
comparing those levels to ranges disclosed in the patent to determine
whether dosage should be increased or decreased. 34 In holding that the
patent did not satisfy the patentable subject matter requirement, the
Court first ruled that the correlation between metabolite levels and
drug safety and efficacy recited in the patent was a "law of nature," 3 5
or, perhaps more precisely, a fact about the world. Putting aside that
unpatentable correlation, the Court then concluded that the patent
contained no other "inventive concept," which the Court held was
essential to satisfying the patentable subject matter requirement. 36
Rather, in telling doctors to administer the drug and determine its

29. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
30. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)). The Federal Circuit later revised and vacated
its original opinion but reached the same result. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
31. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
32. Id. at 609. In the decision below, the en banc Federal Circuit had also invalidated the
patent, building on its prior rulings in Nuijten and Comiskey strengthening the patentable subject
matter requirement. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
33. 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012).
34. Id. at 74-75.
35. Id. at 77.
36. Id. at 72-73.
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metabolite levels, the patent simply recited "well-understood, routine,
conventional activity" that doctors already engaged in. 37 In other words,
the patent did not comply with the eligibility requirement because it
merely instructed doctors to apply established techniques to a newly
discovered fact about the world.
After a 2013 decision holding that isolated DNA segments are
not patentable subject matter because they are "product[s] of nature,"38
the Court in 2014 decided its most recent patentable subject matter
case, Alice. 3 9 Alice involved patents related to a computer program that
used an intermediary to mitigate the risk that only one party to a
financial transaction would perform its obligation. 40 In its opinion
invalidating the patents, the Court drew on Mayo to articulate a twostep test that serves as the foundation for eligibility analysis under
current law, regardless of whether the basis for challenge is that the
patent claims a law of nature, product of nature, natural phenomenon,
or abstract idea. According to the Court, the first step is to determine
whether the patent claim is directed to one of those "patent-ineligible
concepts." 4 1 If so, the next question is whether there are "additional
elements" that "transform" the claim into a patent-eligible application
of the underlying concept. 42 The Court in Alice explained that this
second step of the analysis is "a search for an 'inventive concept'-i.e.,
an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon
the [ineligible concept] itself.' "43
Applying that test to the facts of the case, the Court first
determined that using intermediaries to mitigate risk was an abstract
idea, in part because, like risk hedging in Bilski, "intermediated
settlement is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our
system of commerce." 44 On the second step, the Court concluded that
merely performing that abstract idea on a general-purpose computer,

37. Id. at 79-80.
38. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 595 (2013). In the
same decision, the Court upheld patents on synthetically created DNA because it does not occur
in nature. Id. at 594-95. That is the only time the Supreme Court has found an invention to satisfy
the patentable subject matter requirement in its recent string of cases.
39. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
40. Id. at 2351-52.
41. Id. at 2355.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73
(2012)).
44. Id. at 2356 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
611 (2010)).
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as the patent claimed, did not represent the "inventive concept"
required for patent eligibility. 4 5

B. Alice in the Federal Circuit: The Doctrine
Since Alice, the Federal Circuit has issued 104 decisions on
patentable subject matter. 46 As explained in detail below, the vast
majority of those decisions find the claimed invention not to be patent
eligible. But, in contrast to the Supreme Court's recent case law, the
Federal Circuit has upheld a few patents against eligibility challenges,
almost invariably in precedential opinions. The Federal Circuit's postAlice patentable subject matter decisions cluster in two technological
areas: information technology ("IT") and biotechnology.
IT-related inventions the Federal Circuit has found eligible
include a patent addressing the problem of retaining website visitors
upon the click of an advertising link, 47 a patent on a "self-referential
table for a computer database,"4 8 a patent on filtering internet
content, 49 and a patent on a computerized process for synchronizing
animation with sound.50 Some observers have synthesized the Supreme
Court's and the Federal Circuit's case law into a "technological arts"
test, concluding that "advances in non-technological disciplines-such
as business, law, or the social sciences" are not patent eligible merely
because they employ computer technology, as illustrated by Alice and
Bilski.5 1 On the other hand, patents covering technological
improvements in computer hardware or software itself are patent

45. Id. at 2357-58 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
46. For the methodology we used to arrive at this number, see infra note 84.
47. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
48. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
49. Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
50. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
51. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 721 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring)
("A rule holding that claims are impermissibly abstract if they are directed to an entrepreneurial
objective, such as methods for increasing revenue, minimizing economic risk, or structuring
commercial transactions, rather than a technological one, would comport with the guidance
provided in both Alice and Bilski."); Joshua L. Sohn, A Defense of the Current Jurisprudenceon
Section 101, LAW360 (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/846930/a-defense-of-thecurrent-jurisprudence-on-section-101 [https://perma.cc/VL78-SM22] ("[T]he Federal Circuit has
consistently invalidated patent claims that simply apply economic, business, or human-interaction
practices on a computer without improving the computer itself or any other technological art.").

2018]

CHANGING THE LAW BY SAYING NOTHING

775

eligible, as illustrated by Federal Circuit decisions upholding
eligibility 52 and as suggested by the Supreme Court in Alice. 53
Notably, to satisfy the patentable subject matter requirement,
the patent must be directed to the specific technological improvements
themselves; 54 broad, functional claiming of the idea of solving a problem
in computer technology remains impermissibly abstract.5 5 Thus,
several Federal Circuit cases that uphold eligibility do so only after
narrowing the claims by reading in limits from the specification or a
claim construction ruling-including claim construction rulings made
by the Federal Circuit itself on appeal. 56
In the realm of biotechnology, inventions are more likely to
survive eligibility challenges if the patent covers the making of a new
thing, as opposed to the isolation or detection of a naturally occurring
chemical. In Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., for example, the
52. See Matt Levy, Software Patents Will Survive: How Section 101 Law is Settling Down,
IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/11/30/software-patents-willsurvive/id=75101 [https://perma.cc/2F9R-J5LF] (noting that a claim is patent eligible under recent
Federal Circuit case law if it is "a technical improvement to a technical problem").
53. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014) (noting that the patents in suit
"[did] not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself').
54. See RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ("The inquiry
often is whether the claims are directed to 'a specific means or method' for improving technology
or whether they are simply directed to an abstract end-result." (quoting McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314)).
55. See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[The
first step in the Alice inquiry . .. asks whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted
improvement in computer capabilities . .. or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an 'abstract
idea' for which computers are invoked merely as a tool."). For a discussion of the problem of
functional claiming in software, see Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of
FunctionalClaiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 919-36.
56. See, e.g., McRO, 837 F.3d at 1311, 1313 (construing claims in the manner suggested by
the patentee and drawing on narrowing statements from the specification to uphold eligibility);
Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ('The collection,
filtering, aggregating, and completing steps all depend upon the invention's unique distributed
architecture .... An understanding of how this is accomplished is only possible through an
examination of the claims in light of the written description."); id. at 1306 ("While the components
and functionality necessarily involved in the . .. patent . .. may be generic at first blush, an
examination of the claim in light of the written description reveals that many of these components
and functionalities are in fact neither generic nor conventional individually or in ordered
combination. Instead, they describe a specific, unconventional technological solution, narrowly
drawn to withstand preemption concerns, to a technological problem."); cf. Affinity Labs of Tex.,
LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("Even if all the details contained in
the specification were imported into the . . . claims, the result would still not be a concrete
implementation of the abstract idea."); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d
1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("Turning to the second step of the MayolAlice inquiry, we conclude
that there is nothing in the claims or the specification . . . that constitutes a concrete
implementation of the abstract idea in the form of an 'inventive concept.' "). In one recent case, the
majority's reliance on the specification to narrow the claims and save them from invalidation
prompted a vigorous dissent from Judge Reyna, who asserted that the practice of looking to the
specification "contravenes the fundamental [principle] that the section 101 inquiry is about
whether the claims are directed to a patent-eligible invention, not whether the specification is so
directed." Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1307 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
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court invalidated a patent on methods of detecting fetal DNA that floats
freely in the mother's body. 7 Though the discovery of fetal DNA in the
mother's bloodstream enabled safer and cheaper genetic testing,58 fetal
DNA appears naturally in the mother's blood and the techniques used
to detect and amplify it were well known. 59 By contrast, in Rapid
Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., the Federal Circuit
upheld the eligibility of a patent on a method of preserving hepatocytes,
a type of liver cell.6 0 Even though the patent turned on the discovery
that hepatocytes could survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles-a natural
trait of the cells-the patent claimed an actual, physical method of
preservation (not merely observation) that was new. 6 1 Consequently,
according to the court, the patent was directed to more than an
ineligible natural phenomenon, and it contained the inventive concept
required by Mayo and Alice. 62
C. The Controversy over PatentableSubject Matter
The current state of patentable subject matter doctrine has
elicited vociferous complaints from lawyers, scholars, and even some
judges. They criticize Supreme Court and Federal Circuit case law as
confusing and unpredictable. 63 They worry that the restriction of patent
eligibility threatens innovation, particularly in the fields of
biotechnology and medical diagnostics. 64 And they lament that the
patentable subject matter requirement serves no policy objective not
already addressed by the portions of the Patent Act specifically
requiring the claimed invention to be nonobvious (that is, "inventive")

57. 788 F.3d 1371, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
58. Rachel Rebouch6, Testing Sex, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 519, 527 (2015).
59. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1376-77 (analogizing to Mayo); accord Cleveland Clinic Found. v.
True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying similar reasoning
to invalidate patents on methods of testing for the presence of an enzyme associated with
cardiovascular disease).

60. 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
61. See id. at 1048 ("[Tjhe claims are simply not directed to the ability of hepatocytes to
survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles. Rather, the claims . .. are directed to a new and useful
laboratory technique for preserving hepatocytes." (emphasis added)).
62. Id. at 1050-52.
63. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for
Housecleaningin the Law of PatentableSubject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1770 (2014);
Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated Judicial Wildcard of
Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796, 1798 (2014); Paul R. Michel, The Supreme Court
Saps Patent Certainty, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1751, 1754 (2014); David 0. Taylor, Confusing
Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 158-59 (2016).
64. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256,
286 (2015) (discussing the unclear policy implications of restrictions on patent eligibility in the
field of medical diagnostics).
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and adequately disclosed (that is, not too broadly or too abstractly
described). 65 Those concerns have led the major bar associations
representing patent lawyers to call for legislation overturning the
Supreme Court's patentable subject matter case law. 6 6
The substantive criticisms of current doctrine are, to varying
degrees, well taken. Aspects of the patentable subject matter inquiry
indisputably overlap with other patentability requirements. 67 Though
the Federal Circuit's cases can be synthesized into somewhat coherent
rules (as we attempted to do above), one can certainly identify
inconsistencies that make it difficult to predict future outcomes. 68 And
cases such as Ariosa illustrate the risk that the eligibility requirement
may exclude some socially valuable inventions from patentability. 69
That said, the patentable subject matter requirement does serve an
important proceduralfunction by providing a mechanism to quickly and
cheaply knock out patents that are plainly invalid. 70 Most key

65. J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-EligibleSubject MatterRestrictions, 17 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 267, 281 (2015) (summarizing commentary); see also Jeffrey A. Lefstin & Peter S.
Menell, Restoring the Legislative Framework for PatentingApplications of Scientific Discoveries
23 (U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2767904, 2016), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2767904 [https://perma.cc/M2TY-8HEG] ("By shoehorning an extra requirement for
inventiveness and a concern over undue preemption into

§

101, Mayo contradicts Congress's

carefully crafted framework and ignores the legislative mandate to weigh inventiveness and
preemption concerns under § 103 and § 112, respectively.").
66. See Josh Landau, AlPLA Signs on to IPO's Misguided Proposal on § 101, PAT. PROGRESS
(May 17, 2017), https://www.patentprogress.org/2017/05/17/aipla-signs-ipos-misguided-proposal
[https://perma.ccl68UF-ZEXN].
67. See Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 377 (2015) (discussing the problems of "supplant[ing]
a traditional novelty and nonobviousness analysis" with the patentable subject matter
requirement); Lemley et al., supra note 19, at 1329-32 (considering potential overlaps of-and
distinctions between-patentable subject matter analysis and the disclosure doctrines of § 112).
But cf Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 722 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J.,
concurring) ("Section 101's vital role-a role that sections 103 and 112 are not equipped to take
on-is to cure systemic constitutional infirmities by eradicating those patents which stifle
technological progress and unjustifiably impede the free flow of ideas and information." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)); John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats
Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 701-03 (2016) (defending "the Supreme Court's move to revive subjectmatter eligibility doctrine and to do so in a way that involves doctrinal overlaps," but citing critical
commentary).

68. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 39-40), https://ssrn.comlabstract=2987289 [https://perma.cc/X98A-KD7B]. But cf.
Keith N. Hylton, Patent Uncertainty: Toward a Framework with Applications, 96 B.U. L. REV.
1117, 1148 (2016) (noting that it is not unusual for common law doctrines, such as patentable
subject matter, to be uncertain in application in the initial stages of development).
69. See Gugliuzza, supra note 68, at 39. But cf. Colleen V. Chien & Arti K. Rai, An Empirical
Analysis of Diagnostic Patenting Post-Mayo 3-4 (Jan. 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors) (showing no decline in patenting of diagnostic methods or investment in them since
the Supreme Court's invigoration of the eligibility requirement).
70. Gugliuzza, supra note 68, at 40; cf. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Antitrusting of
Patentability,48 SETON HALL L. REV. 71, 104 (2017) (noting that "[c]ourts' use of subject-matter
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requirements of patentability, such as nonobviousness and enablement,
cannot be resolved until summary judgment at the earliest because they
turn on disputed questions of fact.7 1 But patentable subject matter is a
question of law that can be resolved on the pleadings-before the
parties incur the time and expense of discovery. 72
Our purpose here is not to resolve the vigorous, ongoing debate
over the patentable subject matter requirement. Rather, we hope to
illuminate that debate by presenting empirical evidence about the
Federal Circuit's practices in deciding the issue.
II. THE SILENT JURISPRUDENCE OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
This Part presents the core of our empirical analysis, beginning
with background statistics on how the Federal Circuit resolves appeals
generally, then turning to a detailed examination of the court's postAlice decisions on patentable subject matter.
A. Federal Circuit Decisions Generally
The Federal Circuit decides an appeal in one of three ways: by
writing a precedential opinion, by writing a nonprecedential opinion, or
by affirming without an opinion under Federal Circuit Rule 36.
Precedential opinions make law-they bind future panels of the court
and can be overturned only by the Federal Circuit sitting en banc or by
the Supreme Court. 73 The Federal Circuit issues nonprecedential
opinions, by contrast, when it thinks the disposition will not
significantly advance the law. 7 4 According to the Federal Circuit's
eligibility as a shortcut to other patentability requirements appears to offer significant savings in
decision cost," but that "these savings likely come at the expense of higher error costs" because
courts decide validity before resolving important preliminary issues, such as claim construction).

71. Gugliuzza, supra note 68, at 40.
72. Id. Since Alice the Federal Circuit has regularly held patent claims ineligible on motions
to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d
1350, 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014). But see Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,
882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that factual allegations in the complaint about the
patent's inventiveness required the district court to deny a motion to dismiss on eligibility
grounds); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that a fact dispute
about the patent's inventiveness precluded summary judgment).
73. Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
74.

See FED. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 10.3 to 10.4 (noting that the court will

not publish a precedential opinion if it will not "add significantly to existing law" and listing
various other criteria for determining whether to publish a precedential opinion). For a more
general discussion of how the federal courts of appeals decide when to issue nonprecedential
opinions, see Stephen L. Washy, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at the
Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67 (2004). For an overview of criticisms of nonprecedential
opinions-and a defense of their use-by a federal court of appeals judge, see Boyce F. Martin, Jr.,
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a third of appeals from the district courts and the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") via Rule 36 affirmances; nearly half of the
court's decisions were rendered in precedential opinions. By 2016.
however, those proportions had almost flipped. The court decided over
40% of its district court and PTO appeals via Rule 36, and fewer than a

third of its decisions were precedential opinions.
FIULRE 1: MODE OF

DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPEALS FROM

DISTRICT

COURTS AND

THE PTO

450a

350

The court's increased use of Rule 36 is usually attributed to the
growing number of appeals from the PTO in the wake of the America
Invents Act. which created new opportunities or accused mnfingers
to challenge patent validity in streamlined administrative proceeding
beginning in 2012 - Indeed, as Figure 2 below llustrate the number
of Federal Circuit decisins in appeals from the PTO has increased er
fourfold, from 46 in 2010 to 202 in 2016, causing an overal ncrease in
the Federal Circuit s PTO and di trict court docket from 238 decisions
in 2010 to 449 decisions in 2016. Also, the proportion of PTO appeal

81. See,eg, Holbrook, supra note 28. at 1085-86
82. For an overview of those proceedings, see Paul R Guglizza, (In)ualid Patents, 92 NTRE
DAMIE L. REV. 271, 279- 85 (2016).
83. Federal Circuit appeals from the PTO and the district courts consist almost entirely of
patent cases. A small fraction of PTO appeals (roughly 5%) are trademark cases and an even
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Turning now to our main subject of interest: How has the
Federal Circuit implemented the Alice decision? The Federal Circuit
has issued 33 precedential opinions on patentable subject matter since
the Supreme Court decided Alice in June 2014. As Figure 4 shows, 26
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patent invalid in 78.8% of its post-Alice precedential opinions on
patentable subject rmnatter, the district court or the PTAB had found
invalidity in whole or in part1t in a remarkable 97.0% (32 of 33) of those
cases, as Figure 5 illustrates.o iIndeed,
six of the seven Federal Circuit
precedential opinions finding the patent to be valid reversed a district
court decision that had invalidated the patent i
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By contrast, as Figure 7 shows, the lower tribunal had originally
held the patent invalid in whole or in part in 46 of those 50 cases
(92.0%).
FIGURE 7: DISPOSITiON BELOW IN CASES THAT RESULTED IN FEDERAL
CIRCUIT OPINIONS ON § 101.PosT-ALIcE
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Once Rule 36 decisions at e added to the nix, the dierence in
invalidity rates between the Federal Circuit and the tribunal it
reviews largely disappears: 92.3% for the Federt Circuit, 96.2% for
district courts and the PTAB. In stark contrast to the 2.
rate of
validity inicated b\ the Federal Circuit' precedential opinions,
patentees are, in fact, overwhelmingly losing in the Federal irc tit on
patentable subject matter. And they are overwhelmingly ling
in
decisions that affirm a finding of invalidity by the tibunal below.
It bears emphasizing that more than two-thirds f the ederal
Circuit's patentable subject matter decision sine A/ e hav generated
no precedent, as Figure 10 shows, Tphough the low memorialized n the
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TABLE 1: RESULTS OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT POST-AicE

-Vl. 71:3-765

§ 101

APPEALS, BY

TECH4NOLOGY
VWhi

invalrd

Information technology
Biotechnology

7

1

Totail

91
S

vAlid./Total

98
6

7.1%
167%

The Federal Circuit's publication practice in biotechnology

cases, however, differs substantially from information technology cases,
as Table 2 illustrates. The Federal Circuit has issued a precedential
opinion in five of its six biotechnology-related patentable subject matter

disputes.96 And the sixth decision, a Rule 36 affirmance, only qualifies
as a biotechnology case because we're considering that category to

include any type of medical diagnostic and the patent involved a method
of determining body temperature from a measurement taken at the
forehead. 7 Thus, although biotechnology patents account for only 5.8%
of the Federal Circuit's total decisions on patentable subject matter (six
out of 104), they account for a much higher percentage of the court's

precedential opinions: 15.2% (five out of 33).
TABLE 2: MODE OF DISPOSITION OF FEIERAL CIRCUIT PosT-ALICE
§ 101 APPEALS, BY TECHNOLOGY
Precedenitial Nonprecedendtal

Information technology
Biotechnology

28
5

17
0

Rule 36

Tc tal

53
1

98

6

In sum, the actual practice in the Federal Circuit looks rather
different than what one would glean from simply reading the court's
precedent on patentable subject matter,. Patentees win much less
frequently than precedent suggests. They never win in Rule 36
affirmances. And decisions involving biotechnology or medical
diagnostics are rare. In the next Part, we discuss the implcations of
those results, provide some further analysis of our empirical data, and
discuss the limitations of our study.

96. The five opinions are: Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health D~iagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d
1352 (Fed. Cfir. 2017); Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Celzlirect, Ina., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed, Ciri 2016);
Gienetic Techs. JAd. v. Merial L.L.. 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. fird 2015); In re BRCAl. & BRCA2 Based Hereditary Cance
Test Patent Litig.3 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir, 2014).
97. Exerge Corp. v. Sanomnedics Int'1 Holdings, Inc., 653 F. App'x 760 (Fed. Cfir. 20116).
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Our data cast doubt on any suggestion about the emergence of a more
balanced regime of patentable subject matter.
As Figure 11 shows, the percentage of Federal Circuit decisions
finding invalidity has remained above 9
during each one-year period
following Alice. Moreover, the raw number of invalidity decisions has
more than doubled each year, likely reflecting the increasing frequency
of successful patentable subject matter challenges in the district courts
as the Supreme Court was issuing its string of decisions strengthening
the eligibility requirement from 2010 to 2014.
The reality might be
even worse for patentees than our data suggest, as it seems possible
that the high rates of invalidity could be deterring appeals in some cases
or encouraging parties who do appeal to seek reversal on other grounds.
FIGURE 11: FEDERAL CIRCUIT
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because of the peculiarities of the administrative process, 10 7 but it could
occur in cases appealed from district courts, which account for the vast
majority of patentable subject matter decisions (88 out of 104) in our
dataset. District court decisions overall are not nearly as likely to find
invalidity as the decisions we analyze. 10 8 What the Federal Circuit has
seen in the three years since Alice are primarily rulings that occurred
pretrial. Many defendants have challenged patents under Alice on a
motion to dismiss or an early summary judgment motion. 109 If those
motions are granted, the case is generally over and an appeal follows.
By contrast, if the district court denies the motion, the case will
continue in the district court, either to trial or, more frequently, to a
settlement. So cases in which the district court grants an Alice motion
are more likely to be appealed, and will be appealed sooner, than cases
upholding the patent. Lastly, one might reasonably infer that the
patents challenged on eligibility grounds in the immediate wake of Alice
have been those that were most obviously invalid. 110 Once those easy
invalidations are finished (and once patentees are deterred from
107. Several factors make it unlikely that the Federal Circuit will hear many appeals
challenging PTAB rulings confirming validity. To begin with, the PTAB accounts for a small
fraction of Federal Circuit decisions on patentable subject matter-only 16 of the 104 decisions in
our dataset. Most of those PTAB decisions (10 out of 16) originated in the covered business method
review program, which may not exist in two years. See America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 18(a)(3), 125 Stat. 284, 330-31 (2011) (sunset provision). Also, for a patent to even enter the
covered business method review program, the PTAB must have determined that it is "more likely
than not" that at least one claim of the patent is invalid, 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2012); America Invents
Act § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. at 329-30, which means that any patent entering the program is probably
doomed. (And if the PTAB refuses to institute the proceeding, effectively upholding validity, that
decision is not appealable. 35 U.S.C. § 324(e).) Moreover, patentable subject matter cannot be
challenged in the most popular PTAB proceeding, inter partes review. See id. § 311(b) (permitting
review only on the grounds of anticipation and obviousness). Although the PTAB can consider
patentable subject matter in the new post-grant review proceeding, see id. § 321(b), it's not yet
clear how extensively that proceeding will be used because of the stringent timeline for filing a
petition and statutory estoppel provisions that require accused infringers to forgo certain
invalidity arguments in any future infringement litigation. See Gugliuzza, supra note 82, at 28284. The PTO will, of course, continue to consider the patentable subject matter requirement during
examination, but appeals from examination consist entirely of decisions rejecting applications for
failure to satisfy patentability requirements; decisions approving a patent application cannot be
appealed. See Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 474 (2011); Melissa F.
Wasserman, The PTO's Asymmetric Incentives: Pressureto Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72
OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 385 (2011). Thus, if the Federal Circuit is going to hear more appeals upholding
eligibility, those appeals will likely come from the district courts.
108. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin et al., Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology
Section 101 Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050093
22),
at
(manuscript
2018)
(forthcoming
[https://perma.cclY5RW-VBWE] (reporting a 61.8% invalidity rate in the district courts from June
2014 to February 2017).
109. See id. at 23 (reporting that, from June 2012 to February 2017, 69.4% of district court
decisions on eligibility (249 of 359) were made on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the
pleadings and that another 27.0% (97 of 359) were made on a motion for summary judgment).
110. See Gugliuzza, supra note 68, at 46.
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asserting patents similar to the ones invalidated), patentee win rates
might begin to increase.
In short, our dataset is relatively small and is overwhelmingly
composed of appeals from decisions of invalidity. As the composition of
appeals changes, so might our results.
B. Is the Federal Circuit Changing the Law Through the Way It
Decides Cases?
The fact that most Federal Circuit decisions invalidating patents
under Alice-but none of the decisions upholding patents-are hidden
from view by Rule 36 may affect the long-term development of the
law.111

We would be most concerned if there were reason to think the
Federal Circuit was deliberately skewing perceptions about the results
of patentable subject matter cases by promoting decisions finding
patents valid and demoting decisions finding them invalid. The Federal
Circuit is, of course, not a monolithic entity, which makes it unlikely
that the court as a whole has intentionally tried to distort perceptions
of the law. That said, it is possible that individual judges might be
inclined not to write or to join opinions endorsing positions they dislike,
even if they feel compelled to vote in a certain way because of Supreme
Court precedent. 112
To test for these possibilities, we collected information on how
each Federal Circuit judge voted in each post-Alice patentable subject
matter case in our dataset. We then compared each judge's propensity
to vote in favor of validity on patentable subject matter to the judge's
111. Some have expressed another concern-that the court is not actually paying as much
attention to Rule 36 cases as it does to those in which it writes opinions. See Gene Quinn & Peter
Harter, Rule 36, Collateral Estoppel and Unequal Treatment at the Federal Circuit, IPWATCHDOG
(Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/04/25/rule-36-collateral-estoppel-unequaltreatment-federal-circuit/id=82480/ [https://perma.ccl7PS7-UHUA] ("When you don't have to show
your work how can you or anyone else really be sure that the decision is fair, done after a full
consideration of the issues presented and arguments made, and without making a mistake?"). We
aren't particularly concerned by this. The Federal Circuit has noted that Rule 36 judgments
"receive the full consideration of the Court of Appeals, and are no less carefully decided than the
cases in which [the court] issues full opinions." Phil-Insul Corp. v. Airlite Plastics Co., 854 F.3d
1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The fact that a case is not selected for Rule 36 affirmance until after
bench memos are written and oral argument is held, unlike the practice in many other circuits,
makes the court's statement credible. While it's true that writing an opinion can sometimes surface
issues that might otherwise go unnoticed, that is likely to be rare when the district court opinion,
briefing, and oral argument have all failed to raise those issues. The question of hiding complex
issues in Rule 36 cases, as opposed to finding the case easy to decide under existing law, is
potentially more problematic; we take it up below. See infra Section III.B.
112. See Ben Grunwald, StrategicPublication,92 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with
authors) (documenting the phenomenon of concealing disagreement on the merits by not
publishing the resulting opinion in the regional circuits).
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propensity to cast a vote invalidating a patent on that ground in a Rule
36 affirmance. The hypothesis is that judges who are more likely to vote
to uphold validity are also more likely to cast invalidity votes in
"hidden" decisions under Rule 36 as opposed to written opinions. We
present our results in Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 13 and 14.
Table 3 lists, for each active Federal Circuit judge, the raw
number of their "valid" and "invalid" votes in post-Alice cases involving
§ 101's patentable subject matter requirement, as well as the
percentage of their total § 101 votes that are "valid" votes. 113 As Table
3 illustrates, Judge Newman has the strongest propensity to uphold a
patent, having voted in favor of validity in three out of 15 decisions
(20%). At the other end, Judges Lourie and Dyk have not cast a single
vote in favor of validity since Alice.
TABLE 3: FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGES' VOTES IN POST-ALICE § 101
DECISIONS

Judge
Newman
Stoll
Wallach
Moore
O'Malley
Chen
Taranto
Prost
Reyna
Hughes
Dyk
Lourie

Valid

Invalid
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
0
0

12
17
23
26
18
18
20
21
22
28
18

Vafid/Total
20.0%
15.0%
11.5%
10.3%
10.0%
10.0%
9.1%
4.5%
4.3%
3.4%
0.0%

21

0.0%

Table 4 then lists, again for each active judge, the raw number
of their invalid votes in § 101 cases, the number of those votes that were
cast in cases decided via Rule 36, and the percentage of each judge's
invalid votes cast via Rule 36.

113. In this initial analysis of voting data, we exclude visiting judges and judges who were on
senior status as of the end of our collection period. We discuss below how our results change if we
include the votes of some of those judges. See infra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 4: FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGES' INVALIDITY VOTES IN POST-ALICE
§ 101 DECISIONS

Judge
Newman
O'Malley
Hughes
Moore

Invalid

Rule 36/lnvaild

Rule 36
12

9

75.0%

18
28
26

13
18
16

72.2%
64.3%
61.5%

Taranto
Wallach

20
23

12
13

60.0%

Dyk
Stoll
Lourie
Chen

18
17
21
18

10
9
11
9

55.6%
52.9%
52.4%
50.0%

Reyna

22

10

45.5%

Prost

21

8

38.1%

-

56.5%

Though the number of total § 101 votes by any given judge is
relatively small (a maximum of 29 and a minimum of 15, as one can
calculate from Table 3), some possibility of correlation between overall
voting behavior on § 101 and mode of disposition is apparent, at least
for particular judges. For example, Judge Newman-who, again, is the
judge most likely to vote in favor of validity-is also the judge most
likely to cast a vote of invalidity via Rule 36, having cast 9 out of her 12
invalid votes (75%) in that fashion. At the other end, Chief Judge
Prost-who, as Table 3 illustrated, is among the least likely to vote in
favor of validity, having done so in only 1 out of 22 cases (4.5%)-is also
the least likely to cast an invalidity vote via Rule 36, having cast only 8
of her 21 invalid votes (38.1%) in that fashion. Both of those examples
are consistent with a hypothesis that judges' overall voting propensity
on § 101 may predict their use of Rule 36.
To that end, it's interesting to note that, on the Federal Circuit,
the panel's presiding judge assigns authorship responsibility1 1 4 and
that Judges Newman and Prost are either extremely likely (Newman)
or guaranteed (Prost) to be the presiding judge on any panel. As chief,
Judge Prost presides on any panel on which she sits. As the senior-most
active judge, Judge Newman presides on any panel that does not

114. FED. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 8.2.
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include Chief Judge Prost. 115 Thus, Judges Newman and Prost exert
significant influence over the mode of disposition in cases in which they
participate. The (admittedly limited) data we have gathered suggest
that they could, in fact, be using that influence to implement
preferences to dispose of cases reaching particular results in particular
ways. 116
To test our hypothesis more formally, we ran a simple linear
regression asking whether a judge's propensity to cast an invalidity vote
on § 101 via Rule 36 might be explained by the judge's overall
propensity to vote in favor of validity on that issue. Figure 13 reflects
our results 117

115. Id. at 1.2.
116. In a similar vein, evidence from other circuits suggests that judges in the minority on an
issue will sometimes agree to unanimity in exchange for issuing the decision without an opinion.
See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 19293 (1998). It should be noted that the norm of allowing the panel's more junior judges to speak first
at conference, a norm we understand the Federal Circuit to follow, could partly reduce the
presiding judge's influence over the mode of disposition. And, to be clear, strategic behavior is not
the only explanation for our results (or even the most likely one). See generally infra Section II.C.
For example, one might note that Judge Newman's general propensity to uphold validity means
that the only patents she would vote to invalidate are those that are most plainly invalid and
therefore most appropriate for Rule 36 treatment by the terms of the rule itself. But a similar
explanation about the faithful application of Rule 36 would not necessarily hold for judges such as
Chief Judge Prost whose propensities tilt the opposite direction-likely to invalidate and unlikely
to use Rule 36 to do so. If a judge thought that most patents challenged under § 101 were obviously
invalid, we might expect that judge to use Rule 36 a lot, too, since the judge would view many § 101
cases to be easy ones. Yet we see the opposite-judges who tend to think most patents challenged
under § 101 are invalid also generate a lot of precedent to support their view.
117. We report the full results of our regression analysis in Appendix B.
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FIGURE 13: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN § 101 VOTES AND USE OF RULE 36
FOR ACTIVE FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGES
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As the data suggest, there is a modest correlation, with a judge's
propensity to vote in favor of validity on § 101 explaining 24% of the
odds that a post-Alice § 101 decision will be disposed of via opinion or
Rule 36. Though the correlation is not statistically significant (p =
0.106), that changes if we expand our dataset to include the votes of
judges who are not active Federal Circuit judges but who have cast 10
or more votes in post-Alice § 101 cases. In total, eight judges who are
not active Federal Circuit judges have cast votes in those cases. Those
eight judges account for 45 of the 311 total votes in our dataset. 118 Two
of those eight judges have cast 10 or more votes: Judges Bryson (11
votes, all invalid, six via Rule 36) and Mayer (10 votes, all invalid, four
via Rule 36), both of whom are Federal Circuit judges on senior status.
None of the other six judges have cast more than seven votes. 119 If we
include Judges Bryson and Mayer in our regression, the correlation
becomes statistically significant at a 5% level (p = 0.043), with a judge's
propensity to vote in favor of validity on § 101 now explaining 30% of

118. For a full list of the votes cast in § 101 cases by judges who are not active Federal Circuit
judges, see infra Appendix C.
119. Interestingly, only one of the 45 total votes cast by judges who are not active Federal
Circuit judges was a vote to uphold validity. See Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841
F.3d 1288, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Senior Judge Plager, writing the opinion for the court).
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the odds that a post-Alice § 101 decision will be disposed of via opinion
or Rule 36.120 Figure 14 reflects this analysis.
FIGURE 14: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN § 101 VOTES AND USE OF RULE 36
FOR ACTIVE FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGES PLUS JUDGES BRYSON AND
MAYER
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In short, though it is hard to draw firm conclusions about the
relationship between overall voting behavior and the propensity to use
Rule 36, the limited evidence available post-Alice is intriguing and
warrants close attention going forward, as a larger number of decisions
will permit more robust statistical analysis. 121

120. For the full results of this revised regression analysis, see infra Appendix D. It's also
worth noting that the two active judges who appear to be outliers, Judge Newman and Chief Judge
Prost, play a key role in fueling the overall correlation between voting propensity on validity under
§ 101 and propensity to participate in Rule 36 affirmances. If those judges are removed from the
regression (and Judges Bryson and Mayer are also omitted), the R-square decreases to 0.027 and
the p-value increases to 0.65. For the full results of that regression analysis, see infra Appendix
E.
121. One final note: though our dataset contains 104 decisions, it contains only 311 votes, not
the 312 votes one would expect from 104 decisions by panels of three judges, because one case was
decided by a two-judge panel. buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Also, one vote was a mixed vote to find some claims valid and others invalid. Intellectual Ventures
I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Stoll, J., dissenting in part). To
avoid complications, we have excluded that one mixed vote from the preceding analysis of
individual judges' voting data.
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Another interesting question is how the court's use of Rule 36 in
patentable subject matter cases compares to its use of Rule 36 in other
areas of law.122 As shown in Figure 10 above, the court has decided
51.9% of its post-Alice patentable subject matter appeals through Rule
36 affirmances, 31.7% through precedential opinions, and 16.3%
through nonprecedential opinions. Figure 15 below provides data on the
mode of disposition for all Federal Circuit appeals (including patentable
subject matter cases) from the district courts and the PTO in the threeyear period following Alice. As that figure shows, the court has overall
decided only 41.7% of its cases through Rule 36 affirmances-10% less
than in patentable subject matter cases alone.
FIGURE 15: MODE OF DISPOSITION OF ALL FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPEALS
FROM DISTRICT COURTS AN) THE PTO, POST-ALICE

508 (41 7%)

402 (33.0%)

309 (253%)

a Precedential Opinion

INonprecedential

Opinion

Rule 36

At first blush, a 10 percentage point difference might not seem
consequential. For several reasons, however, it's actually quite

122. Previous studies have performed this comparison for other issues of patent doctrine.
Notably, then-professor (now Federal Circuit judge) Kimberly Moore studied Federal Circuit claim
construction decisions i the wake of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 37i2
(1996) (holding that the judge, not the jury, must interpret the claims of the patent), and found
that the court used Rule 36 less frequently than in other types of cases, "despite the intuition that
[claim construction decisions] would be the least likely to have precedential value.' Moore, supra
note 2. at 237. Moore also found that, once Rule 36 affirmances were taken into account, the
Federal Circuit's reversal rate in claim construction appeals was lower than previous studies had
suggested. Id. at 235-37.
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surprising to find that the Federal Circuit uses Rule 36 with greater
frequency in patentable subject matter cases than in other types of
cases. First, almost all patentable subject matter appeals come from
district courts, 123 not the PTAB, and the Federal Circuit is, overall,
much less likely to use Rule 36 in appeals from district courts as
opposed to the PTAB. In 2016, the Federal Circuit used Rule 36 to
resolve 50.5% of PTO appeals overall. 124 By contrast, the Federal
Circuit disposed of only 35.6% of district court appeals via Rule 36, and
that number would be smaller still if we excluded patentable subject
matter cases, where the Federal Circuit uses Rule 36 with a higherthan-average frequency. 125
Second, Rule 36 is commonly used in circumstances in which the
Federal Circuit is deferring to the finder of fact. 126 Indeed, deference to
fact-finding underlies the first two bases listed in Rule 36 for entering
a judgment without opinion. 127 But patentable subject matter is a
question of law reviewed without deference. 1 2 8
Finally, many Rule 36 decisions outside the patentable subject
matter context come in well-settled areas of law like novelty and
nonobviousness that are the subject of dozens or hundreds of
precedential decisions, so the incremental benefit of one additional
opinion is small. Other types of disputes ripe for Rule 36 treatment
involve questions of claim construction or infringement that are highly
case specific and offer little precedential value. 129 In patentable subject
matter, by contrast, courts are making the law as they go. And the
common law, "I know it when I see it" nature of post-Alice doctrine1 30
means that providing additional signposts for lawyers could be more
important here than in other fields.
123. Eighty-eight of the 104 cases in our dataset. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying
text.

.

124. See supraFigures 2-3.
125. In 2016, the Federal Circuit used Rule 36 to dispose of 55.0% (22 of 40) of its patentable
subject matter appeals from district courts. See infra Appendix A.
126. See Rachel Hughey, How to Get to Federal Circuit Rule 36, LAW360 (July 29, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/
https://www.1aw360.comlarticles/684264/how-to-get-to-federal-circuit-rule-36
UR6Q-BNXY] (suggesting that, to obtain a Rule 36 affirmance, "an appellee should urge that the
case hinges on the facts and is entitled to a highly deferential standard of review").
127. See FED. CIR. R. 36(a)-(b) ("The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without
opinion, citing this rule, when it determines that any of the following conditions exist and an
opinion would have no precedential value: (a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court
appealed from is based on findings that are not clearly erroneous; [or] (b) the evidence supporting
the jury's verdict is sufficient . .
128. See supra note 105.
129. See supra note 122.
130. Eclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equip. Corp., No. CV 14-154, 2014 WL 4407592, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (Wu, J.) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
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C. The ProperRole of Rule 36
Our findings about the Federal Circuit's use of Rule 36 in
patentable subject matter cases also have implications for the ongoing
debate over whether Rule 36 is wise or lawful. The dispute over the
Rule's legality centers on 35 U.S.C. § 144, which provides that the
Federal Circuit, after deciding an appeal from the PTO, "shall issue to
the Director its mandate and opinion."131 The argument that Rule 36 is
unlawful is that § 144 requires the Federal Circuit to issue an opinion
in every case appealed from the PTO. 1 32
We won't dwell long on the legal argument because § 144 applies
only to appeals from the PTO and, as noted, most patentable subject
matter appeals arise from the district courts. But there are reasons to
be skeptical of any argument that Rule 36 is illegal. For starters,
appellate courts have, for better or worse, long engaged in the practice
of affirming without writing an opinion. 133 In fact, since 1967, Rule 36
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure has explicitly authorized
the federal courts of appeals to render judgment with no opinion. 134 As
the Supreme Court recently held in a decision involving the patent
venue statute, if Congress wants to overturn a settled practice of the
federal courts, it must make its intent clear in the text of the statute. 1 3 5
We doubt the relevant language of § 144 would pass that bar. It doesn't
explicitly require an opinion in every case. And it was enacted in 1984,
nearly two decades after the enactment of Appellate Rule 36 and at a
time by which the practice of issuing decisions without opinion was well
established as a general matter, 1 3 6 even if the practice had not yet
caught on in the Federal Circuit, 137 which, at the time, was barely two
years old.

131. 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2012) (emphasis added).
132. See Crouch, supra note 4, at 562.
133. See, e.g., Philip Marcus, Affirmance Without Opinion, 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 212, 213-14
(1937); Max Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 486, 491 (1930). But
cf. DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND

PERSONNEL 561 (2d ed. 2006) (outlining divergent practices among the various federal and state
appellate courts).
134. FED. R. APP. P. 36(a) ("A judgment is entered when it is noted on the docket. The clerk
must prepare, sign, and enter the judgment: (1) after receiving the court's opinion-but if settlement
of the judgment's form is required, after final settlement; or (2) if a judgment is rendered without
an opinion, as the court instructs." (emphasis added)).
135. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017) ("When
Congress intends to effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily provides a relatively clear indication
of its intent in the text of the amended provision.").
136. See Dowd, supra note 4, at 34-42 (recounting the legislative history of the amendment).
137. See Crouch, supranote 4, at 568 (noting that the Federal Circuit adopted Rule 36 in 1989).
But see Dowd, supra note 4, at 44 (noting that one of the Federal Circuit's predecessors, the Court
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Even assuming the Federal Circuit is legally permitted to
dispose of over half of its patentable subject matter cases without an
opinion, there remains a policy question about whether that practice is
good for the patent system. On one hand, the Alice inquiry is a common
law, fact-specific analysis, and examples are probably the best way to
flesh out the contours of the test. On the other hand, the Federal
Circuit's time and energy are finite. The court's frequent use of Rule 36
might demonstrate merely that it views many § 101 appeals as easy
cases given the Supreme Court's obvious skepticism of software and
business method patents, which account for the overwhelming majority
of patentable subject matter challenges decided by the Federal
Circuit. 138 More examples might be useful, but the judges of the Federal
Circuit should have some discretion about where to direct their opinionwriting efforts.
One might, of course, view the disproportionate number of
precedential opinions upholding validity as evidence of the court trying
to undermine Supreme Court precedent hostile to patentees. Indeed,
our data suggest the possibility that individual judges could use Rule
36 to counteract that precedent. But one could just as easily view the
Federal Circuit's tendency to write precedential opinions when
upholding patents as reflecting an intermediate appellate court that is
simply doing its job in implementing the somewhat ambiguous
eligibility decisions the Supreme Court has issued. Viewed through that
lens, the Federal Circuit, by writing precedential opinions upholding
validity that can be compared to the large body of precedent invaliding
patents on eligibility grounds, is providing something similar to the
percolation that occurs among the various regional courts of appeals in
other areas of law. 139 And even if one characterized the Federal Circuit
as trying to resist Supreme Court precedent, any resistance is having
only a modest effect-nearly 80% of the Federal Circuit's precedential
opinions still invalidate the asserted patent.
Rather than resistance by the Federal Circuit, two other
considerations more likely explain the disproportionate number of
precedential opinions upholding validity. First, because of the high rate
of invalidity in the tribunals it reviews, the Federal Circuit has had few

of Customs and Patent Appeals, occasionally issued very short affirmances with practically no
substantive reasoning).
138. See supraTables 1-2.
139. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme
Court-and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 795 (2010); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal
Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 350, 352-64 (2014); see also J. Jonas Anderson, Patent
Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1094 (2014) (exploring the benefits of a "dialogic" relationship
among the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court, and Congress on matters of patent law).
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opportunities to even consider affirming a ruling of validity via Rule 36.
Because findings of invalidity on patentable subject matter are the
norm in district courts and at the PTAB, a Federal Circuit decision
affirming invalidity is hardly surprising and is therefore more likely to
warrant an opinionless or nonprecedential disposition under the
Federal Circuit's governing rules. By contrast, a decision upholding a
patent against a patentable subject matter challenge is more unusual
and thus more likely to warrant a precedential opinion. 140 As we showed
in Tables 1 and 2, information technology cases striking down patents
are not uncommon, but biotechnology cases of any sort are uncommon,
which would explain the court's practice of writing precedential
opinions in practically every biotechnology case its sees while
frequently affirming via Rule 36 in the information technology cases
that compromise the bulk of the Federal Circuit's § 101 docket.
Second, by writing a precedential opinion in nearly every case in
which it finds a patent to be valid, the court is also responding to the
demands of its audience, as a semi-specialized court such as the Federal
Circuit might be expected to do. 141 Alice, decided in June 2014, was the
fourth Supreme Court decision in four years ruling against the patentee
on patentable subject matter. By the time the Federal Circuit issued its
first post-Alice opinion upholding validity in December 2014,142 the
Federal Circuit's audience-patent applicants, litigants, district judges,
and the PTO-desperately needed examples of inventions that
remained patent eligible. An ongoing desire for examples is clear from
the frequent guidance that the PTO issues to its examining corps (and
that is widely read by patent practitioners) after many precedential
Federal Circuit decisions on patentable subject matter. 143 The examples
provided by the Federal Circuit's precedential opinions are also
critically important to practice on the ground. The PTO, for instance,
has instructed its examiners that they should not reject an application

140. A similar but more general observation relates to the fact that, to invalidate a patent, the

court needs to find only one good argument against validity, so if there's an easy argument for
invalidity, the court can ignore the hard issues. To uphold validity, by contrast, the court must
consider every argument the challenger raises and reject it. Because a decision upholding validity
must engage the hard issues, it's more likely that such a decision would merit a precedential
opinion.

141. See BAUM, supra note 6, at 99.
142. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
143. The PTO's extensive library of patentable subject matter guidance is available at Subject
Matter Eligibility, U.S.

PAT.

&

TRADEMARK

OFF.,

regulations/examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility
[https://perma.ccl7JBD-RB7A].

https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-

(last

visited

Jan.

19,

2018)
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for claiming an abstract idea unless the claimed invention is similar to
something the courts have previously identified as an abstract idea. 144
The Federal Circuit's sensitivity to its audience's need for
examples is clearest in biotechnology cases. Uncertainty over
patentability flourished in that field after Mayo. 145 Yet the court has
received few biotechnology appeals to date, so it has capitalized on every
opportunity it has had to provide guidance to the bar, the district courts,
and the PTO.
In short, the Federal Circuit has, in its precedential opinions,
delivered the types of examples its audience needed. But those opinions
now provide an inaccurate picture of how disputes over patentable
subject matter are actually resolved. 146
It's tough to say whether the disproportionate number of
precedential decisions favoring patentees has actually skewed
substantive law. On one hand, as shown in Figures 8 and 9, the rates of
invalidity in the Federal Circuit and in the decisions appealed to the
Federal Circuit are both over 90%, suggesting that the Federal Circuit,
district courts, and the PTAB are applying the patentable subject
matter requirement in a consistent fashion. As we also noted, however,
the actual invalidity rate in the district courts is lower-some evidence
suggests it's around 60%.147 But few decisions upholding patents have
been appealed to date. And many of them may never be appealed due

144. See

U.S.

PATENT

& TRADEMARK OFFICE, JULY 2015 UPDATE:

SUBJECT MATI'ER

https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-20153
(2015),
ELIGIBILITY
update.pdf [https://perma.ce/85LZ-TGEH] ("This discussion is meant to guide examiners and
ensure that a claimed concept is not identified as an abstract idea unless it is similar to at least
one concept that the courts have identified as an abstract idea.").
145. See Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preservingthe Future of Personalized
Medicine, 49 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1881, 1911 (2016) (describing how the Supreme Court's
"adherence to standards over rules in many

§ 101

cases [has] fostered confusion among the lower

courts and within the Federal Circuit" and arguing that "uncertainty ... affects incentives to
innovate, as scientists and investors may be reluctant to move forward with product development
if they cannot determine whether they will be able to protect their investment"); see also Bernard
Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1386 (2014) ("Many patents in the
biotechnology, medical diagnostics, and software industries have an unpatentable concept at their
core. But after Mayo, it is unclear whether these patents have added 'enough' to the claims to
render them patent eligible.").
146. Descriptively, one might conceptualize this disconnect between the results in precedential
opinions and the results in eligibility disputes overall as a variety of "selective transmission"with the court hiding parts of the law from public view in order to achieve broader normative goals.
See Meir Dan-Cohen, DecisionRules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in CriminalLaw,
97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 635, 667 (1984) (defending the use of selective transmission against
arguments that it is inconsistent with the rule of law).
147. See Lefstin et al., supra note 108, at 22.
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to settlements or strategic choices by the parties about what arguments
to pursue as a case moves forward.148
Understanding how the Federal Circuit is using Rule 36 in
patentable subject matter cases is important. Litigants and
policymakers need to understand that while the law, as it is articulated
in precedential appellate opinions, may be setting out guideposts for
what is and isn't patentable subject matter, the overwhelming majority
of patents challenged under § 101 are failing the test. In other words,
the Federal Circuit's post-Alice precedential opinions set out a
"framework" of patentable subject matter doctrine, with a handful of
decisions defining the overarching structure of the law. While that
framework has the benefit of providing a small number of clearly
identified doctrinal points of reference, it lacks the information that
becomes evident when one looks, as we have in this Article, at the entire
population of patentable subject matter decisions. On the whole, those
decisions reach different results than the precedential opinions alone.
But the entire population of decisions-what the Federal Circuit does
"in fact" 149-iS what, in our view, defines the real contours of patentable
subject matter doctrine.
We think, therefore, that more transparency as to the nature of
the issues decided would be appropriate, allowing those with an interest
in patent law to understand what the law actually is in practice, not

148. Indeed, the arguments about lack of inventiveness or overbreadth that usually form the
basis for a § 101 motion often become subsumed within arguments about anticipation,
obviousness, or adequate disclosure, in part because most courts treat patentable subject matter

as a question of law that is definitively resolved by the judge, usually before trial. See, e.g.,
ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2:13-CV-1112, 2016 WL 1637280, at *6 (E.D. Tex.
Apr. 25, 2016) (denying Apple's post-trial motion for JMOL of ineligibility, noting that the issue of
eligibility was not submitted to the jury and speculating that "[p]erhaps [Apple's] motion is
actually a motion for reconsideration" of the court's denial of Apple's request for judgment on the
pleadings). Thus, an accused infringer who loses a § 101 motion will understandably move on to
emphasize other grounds of invalidity that will be given to the jury-even though, it should be
noted, many of those grounds present questions of law, too. See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries
Decide If PatentsAre Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1727 (2013) (noting that the Federal Circuit has
endorsed the practice of sending the ultimate question of validity to the jury but questioning that
approach to resolving questions of law); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Procedure of Patent
Eligibility, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with authors) (questioning whether patentable
subject matter presents solely a question of law). As this Article was going to press, the Federal
Circuit issued two decisions that, unlike many of the court's other post-Alice decisions, emphasized
that questions of fact can sometimes underpin the § 101 analysis. See Aatrix Software, Inc. v.
Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that factual allegations
in the plaintiffs complaint about the patent's inventiveness defeated a motion to dismiss on § 101
grounds); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that the question
of whether claim elements are "conventional" for § 101 purposes is a question of fact).
149. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897),
reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 994 (1997).
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just what the precedential opinions say.15 0 To be clear, we're not
arguing that the Federal Circuit should write a precedential opinion in
every patentable subject matter case. But many lawyers don't have the
time (or the financial resources) to dig through dockets and briefs-as
we have done to prepare this Article-to determine the basis for the
nearly 200 Rule 36 affirmances the Federal Circuit issues every year. A
short, nonprecedential opinion making clear the arguments raised by
the appellant (and rejected by the court) would provide valuable
information. To address any concern that an increase in
nonprecedential opinions would distract the court from its work in more
important or difficult cases or that the court would be overwhelmed by
lawyers citing and relying on nonprecedential opinions in their briefs, 15 1
the opinions need not (and probably should not) contain elaborate
reasoning. But simply indicating the legal issues considered and
rejected would help reduce any misconceptions about how patent
appeals are actually resolved. Alternatively, the court itself (or perhaps
the Office of the Chief Economist at the PTO) could collect and regularly
publish data about the issues raised in cases disposed of via Rule 36.152
At minimum, we hope this Article calls attention to the need for
scholars, the media, lawyers, and anyone else interested in the patent
system to keep a close eye on how "silent" affirmances under Rule 36
may be altering substantive law.
CONCLUSION

Our study sheds light on the important question of how the law
on the books differs from the actual experience of litigants. Some of our
findings confirm the conventional wisdom among patent lawyers and

150. Cf. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 285 (1996)
(criticizing "no opinion" affirmances, such as those issued under Federal Circuit Rule 36, on the
ground that "[e]xplanation" of the basis for a decision "is fundamental to our system of justice").
151. The judges of the Federal Circuit raised similar concerns when opposing the 2006
adoption of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which overturned prior circuit court rules
prohibiting the citation of nonprecedential opinions. See, e.g., Letter from Haldane Robert Mayer,
Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, to Peter G. McCable, Sec'y, Comm. on
Rules of Practice & Procedure, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Jan. 6, 2004),
[https://perma.cc/6DEYhttp://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr-import/03-A-P-086.pdf
A323].
152. Until 2011, the Federal Circuit Clerk's Office published more detailed data about the
court's caseload than is currently available on the court's website. See Jason Rantanen, Federal
Circuit Statistics-FY 2011, PATENTLYO (Oct. 26, 2011), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/10/
federal-circuit-statistics-fy-2011.html [https://perma.cclLH4C-QSVJ] (reporting the updated data
and removal of previous data). Observers have expressed disappointment about this change in
practice. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking FederalCircuit Jurisdiction,100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1488
n.278 (2012); Rantanen, supra.
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scholars. For example, patentees lose a lot of patentable subject matter
disputes, particularly at the Federal Circuit. But someone who's
familiar mainly with the court's precedential opinions might be
surprised by the magnitude of patentees' loss rate, which exceeds 90%.
We also highlighted some intriguing differences in how the court
decides to dispose of a case-whether through a precedential opinion,
nonprecedential opinion, or Rule 36 affirmance-depending on the
result the court reaches. It will be interesting to see if those patterns
change as the Federal Circuit reviews more decisions upholding patent
validity against § 101 challenges and as patent drafters adjust their
behavior to account for the new law of patentable subject matter.
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APPENDIX A

Federal Circuit Decisions on Patentable Subject Matter
June 20, 2014 through June 19, 2017153
Precedential Opinions
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266
(Fed. Cir. 2016)
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)
Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)
Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 2015)
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827
F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent
Litig., 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776
F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed.
Cir. 2017)
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir.
2014)
Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016)
153. An updated list of the Federal Circuit's post-Alice decisions on patentable subject matter
can

be

found

https://does.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1b5HL66qJG3B1N2qi9EKZuVhlOR2TUX9J2EnHUq3clQc
[https://perma.cc/4JQR-2LX4].

at

812

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:3:765

Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir.
2016)
Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial, LLC, 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2015)
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315
(Fed. Cir. 2017)
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307
(Fed. Cir. 2016)
Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2015)
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)
Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2016)
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2015)
Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)
RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir.
2016)
Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2017)
In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir.
2016)
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2015)
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Nonprecedential Opinions
Allvoice Devs. US, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 612 F. App'x 1009 (Fed.
Cir. 2015)
In re Brown, 645 F. App'x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
In re Chorna, 656 F. App'x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Clarilogic, Inc. v. FormFree Holdings Corp., 681 F. App'x 950 (Fed.
Cir. 2017)
Coffelt v. NVIDIA Corp., 680 F. App'x 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
EasyWeb Innovations, LLC v. Twitter, Inc., 689 F. App'x 969 (Fed.
Cir. 2017)
Evolutionary Intelligence LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 677 F.
App'x 679 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App'x 991 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App'x 1005 (Fed. Cir.
2014)
In re Salwan, 681 F. App'x 938 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Shortridge v. Found. Constr. Payroll Serv., LLC, 655 F. App'x 848
(Fed. Cir. 2016)
Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., 680 F. App'x 977 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
TDE Petroleum Data Sols., Inc., v. AKM Enter., Inc., 657 F. App'x
991 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App'x 1001 (Fed. Cir.
2017)
Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo Inc., 664 F. App'x 968 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC,
635 F. App'x 914 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
W. View Research, LLC v. Audi AG, 685 F. App'x 923 (Fed. Cir.
2017)
Rule 36 Affirmances
In re Alsabah, 677 F. App'x 684 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Appistry, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 676 F. App'x 1007 (Fed. Cir.
2017)
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Appistry, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 676 F. App'x 1008 (Fed. Cir.
2017)
Athenahealth, Inc. v. CareCloud Corp., 678 F. App'x 1025 (Fed.
Cir. 2017)
Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 639 F. App'x 652 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)
Blue Spike, LLC v. Google Inc., 669 F. App'x 575 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Broadband iTV, Inc. v. Hawaiian Telcom, Inc., 669 F. App'x 555
(Fed. Cir. 2016)
CallWave Commc'ns LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 672 F. App'x 995
(Fed. Cir. 2017)
Capital Dynamics v. Cambridge Assocs., LLC, 668 F. App'x 889
(Fed. Cir. 2016)
Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int'l Sec. Exch., LLC, 640 F. App'x
986 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Clear with Computs. LLC v. Altec Indus. Inc., 636 F. App'x 1015
(Fed. Cir. 2016)
Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 626 F. App'x 1010
(Fed. Cir. 2015)
CMG Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pac. Tr. Bank, 616 F. App'x 420 (Fed. Cir.
2015)
Concaten, Inc. v. AmeriTrak Fleet Sols., LLC, 669 F. App'x 571
(Fed. Cir. 2016)
Datatreasury Corp. v. Fid. Nat'l Info. Servs., Inc., 669 F. App'x 572
(Fed. Cir. 2016)
DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 599 F. App'x 956
(Fed. Cir. 2015)
E. Coast Sheet Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Autodesk, Inc., 645 F.
App'x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Essociate, Inc. v. Clickbooth.com, LLC, 641 F. App'x 1006 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)
Exergen Corp. v. Sanomedics Int'l Holdings, Inc., 653 F. App'x 760
(Fed. Cir. 2016)
Gametek LLC v. Zynga Inc., 597 F. App'x 644 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
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GoDaddy.com, LLC v. RPost Commc'ns Ltd., 685 F. App'x 992
(Fed. Cir. 2017)
GT Nexus, Inc. v. INTTRA, Inc., 669 F. App'x 562 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
HealthTrio LLC v. Aetna, Inc., 673 F. App'x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Integrated Claims Sys., LLC v. Travelers Lloyds of Tex. Ins. Co.,
684 F. App'x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 643 F. App'x
1014 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
IPLearn-Focus, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 667 F. App'x 773 (Fed. Cir.
2016)
Jericho Sys. Corp. v. Axiomatics Inc., 642 F. App'x 979 (Fed. Cir.
2016)
Joao Bock Transaction Sys., LLC v. Jack Henry & Assocs., Inc.,
803 F.3d 667 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
Kickstarter, Inc. v. Fan Funded, LLC, 654 F. App'x 481 (Fed. Cir.
2016)
Kombea Corp. v. Noguar L.C., 656 F. App'x 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Safeway, Inc., 639 F. App'x 637 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)
Linkgine, Inc. v. VigLink, Inc., 689 F. App'x 965 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Macropoint, LLC v. Fourkites, Inc., 671 F. App'x 780 (Fed. Cir.
2016)
Morales v. Square, Inc., 621 F. App'x 660 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
Morsa v. Facebook, Inc., 622 F. App'x 915 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
Netflix, Inc. v. Rovi Corp., 670 F. App'x 704 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Network Apparel Grp., LP v. Airwave Networks Inc., 680 F. App'x
1003 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Nextpoint, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 680 F. App'x 1009 (Fed.
Cir. 2017)
NexusCard, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 688 F. App'x 916 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Novo Transforma Techs. LLC v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 669 F.
App'x 555 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Open Parking, LLC v. ParkMe, Inc., 683 F. App'x 932 (Fed. Cir.
2017)
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Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. v. Xilinx, Inc., 684 F. App'x 971 (Fed.
Cir. 2017)
Parus Holdings Inc. v. Sallie Mae Bank, 677 F. App'x 682 (Fed.
Cir. 2017)
Personalized Media Commc'ns, LLC. v. Amazon.com Inc., 671 F.
App'x 777 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Pres. Wellness Techs. LLC v. Allscripts Healthcare Sols. Inc., 684
F. App'x 970 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Priceplay.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 627 F. App'x 925 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)
RaceTech, LLC v. Ky. Downs, LLC, 676 F. App'x 1009 (Fed. Cir.
2017)
Ret. Capital Access Mgmt. Co. v. U.S. Bancorp, 611 F. App'x 1007
(Fed. Cir. 2015)
SkillSurvey, Inc. v. Checkster LLC, 683 F. App'x 930 (Fed. Cir.
2017)
Voxathon LLC v. FCA US LLC, 671 F. App'x 793 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
In re Webb, 609 F. App'x 643 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
White Knuckle Gaming, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 683 F. App'x 931
(Fed. Cir. 2017)
Williamson v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 683 F. App'x 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Wireless Media Innovations, LLC v. Maher Terminals, LLC, 636
F. App'x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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B

Regression Analysis Including All Active Judges
Regression Statistcs
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.4896
0.2397
01637
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12

SS
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Votes Cast in Federal Circuit § 101 Cases by Judges Who Were
Not Active Federal Circuit Judges as of June 19, 2017

0
0

11
10

01

7

Schall (Senior)
Linn (Senior)
Plager (Senior)
Fogel (N.D. Cal)

0
01

7

Stark (D. Del.)

0

Ceeg

(Senior)

0

Valid/Total Rule 36/Invalid

Rule 36

Invalid

Valid

Bryson (Senior)
Mayer (Senior)

4

31
1

6

0.0%

54.5%

4

0.0%
00%.
0.0%
0.0%

400%

25.0%

33.3%
100.0%
0.0%

-1.--------

5'
5
2,

+

[udie

1t

0.0%

0

0.0%

71.4%
71.4%
50.0%
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APPENIMX D

Regression Analysis Including All Active Judges Plus Judges
Bryson and Mayer
Regression Sisfsas
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.5470
0.2992
0.2408
0.0932
14
df

Regression
Residual

1
12

Total

13

Intercept
Validfrobtal

SS
MS
F
Signijfince F
0.044471387 004447139 5.12406075 0.042928112
0.104147213 010867893

0.1486186

Coefficients StandardError
0.4904482
0.0382244
0.4129995
0.9348816

tStut
12.83
2.26

P-vAlue
0.000
0.043

Upper 95%
Lower 95%
0.4071644 0.5737320
0.0350331 £8347301
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APPENDIX E

Regression Analysis Including All Active Judges Except Judge
Newman and Chief Judge Prost
Regression
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

stiusne
0.1644
0.0270
-0.0946
0.0808
10
df

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Valid/Total

1
8
9

SS
MS
F
Signifunce F
0.001451491 0.001451491 0.2223564 0.649842891
0.052222166 0.006527771
0.053673657

Coefficents Standard Error
0.5525424
0.0465664
0.2488529
0.5277374

t Stat
1187
0.47

P-mlue
0.000
0.650

Lower 95%
Upper 95%
0.4451602
0.6599247
-0.9681117
1.4658174

